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This paper addresses the statutory financial relations and financial autonomy of local 
government in Nigeria, and the freedom of local government to generate revenue from its 
assigned sources without external interference. It focuses particularly on a financial 
instrument called the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) and how its 
operations have positively or negatively affected the financial autonomy of local 
government councils and the inter-relations between state and local government in 
Nigeria.1 
 
Intergovernmental relations in Nigeria 
Local government in Nigeria is a product of decentralization and is established by law. 
As a federal state, Nigeria has three tiers of government (federal, state and local) whose 
intergovernmental relations (which include political, financial, judicial and 
administrative) are mainly established by the constitution. Each tier is required to operate 
within its area of jurisdiction, and any action to the contrary is null and void to the extent 
of its inconsistency with the law. This is meant to guarantee the autonomy of each tier. 
Intergovernmental relations may be defined as “the complex pattern of interactions, co-
operations and inter-dependence between two or more levels of government” (Ogunna 
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1996: 350). According to Adamolekun (2002:60), intergovernmental relations “is the 
term commonly used to describe the interactions between the different levels of 
government within the state.” It can also be seen as “important interactions occurring 
between governmental institutions of all types and in all spheres” (Anderson 1960:3). It 
exists in all types of state but is more pronounced, complex, controversial and 
contentious in federal states. The level of development in a given state tends to be 
determined by the quality of its intergovernmental relations. 
 
The State Joint Local Government Account 
Under the Constitution of Nigeria, the SJLGA is a special account maintained by each 
state government “into which shall be paid allocations to the local government councils 
of the state from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State” (Section 
162 [6], 1999 Constitution of Nigeria). The Account is meant to be a mechanism that can 
implement the notion of ‘fiscal federalism’ at the local government level in Nigeria. 
Section 162 of the Constitution also provides for how public revenue shall be collected 
and distributed among the three tiers of government in the country. The following extract 
outlines the key elements of section 162:   
 
 
(1)  The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called “the Federation Account” into 
which shall be paid all revenues collected by the Government of the Federation, ….”  
 
(2)  The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal 
Commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals from the Federation Account, and 
in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles 
especially those of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as 
well as population density.  Provided that the principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in 
any approved formula as being not less than thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the 
Federation Account directly from any natural resources. 
 
(3)  Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall be distributed among the 
Federal and State Governments and the local government councils in each state on such terms 
and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(4)  Any amount standing to the credit of the states in the Federation Account shall be distributed 
among the states on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. 
 
(5)  The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in the Federation Account shall 
also be allocated to the States for the benefit of their local government councils on such terms and 
in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(6)  Each State shall maintain a special account to be called “State Joint Local Government 
Account” into which shall be paid all allocations to the local government councils of the state from 
the Federation Account and from the Government of the state. 
 
(7)  Each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of jurisdiction such proportion of 
its total revenue on such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the National 
Assembly. 
 
(8)   The amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a state shall be distributed 
among the local government councils of that state on such terms and in such manner as may be 
prescribed by the House of Assembly of the state.
 
Section 162, 1999 Constitution of Nigeria [extract] 
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Local Government Financial Autonomy 
Local government autonomy can be defined as “the freedom of the local government to 
recruit and manage its own staff, raise and manage its own finances, make by-laws and 
policies, and discharge its functions as provided by law without interference from the 
higher governments” (Ogunna 1996: 350). This includes political, financial and 
administrative autonomy. Financial autonomy of local government is the “freedom to 
impose local taxation, generate revenue within its assigned sources, allocate its financial 
and material resources, determine and authorize its annual budget without external 
interference. It must be noted that local government autonomy is not absolute; the third 
tier of government retains functional and fiscal relations with the higher tiers of 
government, however, the relationship must function within the relevant law. 
 
Transfer of Revenue Resources 
There are reasons why transfers of revenue resources from higher to lower levels of 
government occur in a federation.  Firstly, this relates to the nature of the functions and 
revenue resources of the three tiers of government. These may be determined either 
traditionally, constitutionally or administratively, and may exhibit an imbalance between 
responsibility and revenue which requires the higher tier of government to ‘make good’ 
such imbalance by executing transfers of financial resources. These are referred to as 
‘deficiency’ transfers (Okafor 2001:49).  Secondly, lower levels of government may have 
variations in revenue raising capacities. Due to the fact that it is desirable for every state 
or locality to attain given levels of service delivery, states or localities whose revenue 
raising capacities are low need to impose a heavier tax burden than those with higher 
revenue-raising capacities. In order to eliminate this burden in the former, the latter 
(more well-resourced states or localities) make transfers of resources to them. This type 
of transfer is called an ‘equalization’ transfer (Graham 1964: 8). These two types of 
resource transfers are commonly referred to as ‘unconditional intergovernmental grants-
in-aid’. We can now turn to the processes of statutory funding of local government in 
Nigeria. 
 
Statutory Funding of Local Government in Nigeria 
For local government to serve as a powerful instrument for rapid community and rural 
development it must possess a solid and sound financial base. To ensure that local 
government performs the numerous functions assigned to it (Section 7, Schedule 4, 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria), the Constitution makes provision for statutory funding of local 
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government. Specifically, Section 7(1) mandates the government of every state to make 
provisions for the financing of local government councils in the state. Key provisions of 
this section are: 
 (a)  The National Assembly shall make provisions for statutory 
allocation of public revenue to local government councils in the 
Federation; and 
 
(b)  The House of Assembly of a state shall make provisions for 
statutory allocation of public revenue to local government councils 
within the state. 
 
In addition, section 162 states that: 
 
(3)  Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account shall 
be distributed among the Federal and State Governments and the local 
government councils in each state on such terms and in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(5)  The amount standing to the credit of local government councils in 
the Federation Account shall also be allocated to the states for the 
benefit of their local government councils on such terms and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
(7)  Each state shall pay to local government councils in its area of 
jurisdiction such proportion of its total revenue on such terms and in 
such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
 
To give effect to the above provisions for statutory funding of local governments, 20% of 
the amount standing in the Federation Account is paid to them on a monthly basis, while 
10% of each state’s internally generated revenue is also paid to the local government 
councils in the state. It must be noted that the percentage allocations to local government 
councils are not quantitatively certain. They depend at any given time on the amount 
standing in the Federation Account and the amount internally generated by each state 
respectively. 
 
The bulk of the revenues of most local government councils in Nigeria comes from the 
federal government. In some cases, especially in rural local governments, the grant 
constitutes as much as 80% of their revenue (Obi, 2001:89). The state statutory allocation 
to local government councils is usually small and in most cases unreliable. 
 
Operation of the State Joint Local Government Account 
To distribute the amount standing in the SJLGA to the local government councils in each 
state, section 162 (8) of the Constitution directs that: 
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The amount standing to the credit of local government councils of a state 
shall be distributed among the local government councils of that state on 
such terms and in such manner as may be prescribed by the House of 
Assembly of the state. 
 
State Houses of Assembly have passed SJLGA laws to give effect to the above 
constitutional provisions, however, evidence has shown that such laws are usually tend to 
further compound the already distressed financial position of local government councils. 
This results from various forms of deductions and diversions of funds intended for local 
government.   State governments that are constitutionally required to fund local 
government councils have instead used the SJLGA mechanism (or Account) to hold local 
governments hostage and make them appendages of the state. In practice, the operation 
of the SJLGA has denied local government councils their financial autonomy.  
 
It should be noted that the state government is not intended to be a beneficiary of the 
SJLGA, rather, it is a trustee of the Account. It is required to maintain the Account for 
the benefit of the local governments by ensuring that the amount allocated for this third 
tier of government is equitably and fairly shared among the councils, adhering strictly to 
constitutionally stipulated criteria. However, reports across the country indicate that most 
state governments are using SJLGA laws contrary to this intention.  
 
Dlakwa (2004:119-122) has outlined this problem in the case of Borno State. He states 
that under the Borno SJLGA Distribution and Fiscal Committee Law 2002, a committee 
was set up to administer the Account. It comprised:  
  the Commissioner of the Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs 
(Chairman) 
 Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs 
 Accountant-General of the State 
 all Local Government Councils’ Chairmen in the State  
 a representative of the Borno State Primary Education Board 
 a representative of the Board of Internal Revenue, and  
 the Director of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs (Secretary). 
 
It should be observed that the key officers of the committee are state government 
officials and, in the view of this author, the committee was structured from the outset to 
disadvantage the Local Government Councils (LGCs). Moreover, the Borno SJLGA Law 
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2002 empowers the committee to effect the following deductions before distributing 
funds from the Account to LGCs:  
1. 3% of the fund of each council due to the emirate councils 
2. 15% of the total personnel emolument of those retired in each council 
3. 1% as a training fund 
4. 5% of the total allocation of each council as a stabilization account 
5. 2% of the total allocation of each council as an administrative charge 
6. 1.5% of the allocation of each council to the department of local government  
7. 0.5% of the allocation to the local government audit department. 
 
Thus the Borno state government effectively deducted and diverted funds meant for 
development of local areas, contributing significantly to the abysmal performance of 
local governments in providing good governance for the community. According to 
Dlakwa (2004:121), between March 2002 and March 2003 a total of N13.3bn2 was 
available for councils in Borno State. Out of this amount the state government deducted 
almost half (see Table 1).  
 
Aggrieved by this incessant interference in local government’s financial autonomy, 26 
LGC Chairmen (with the exception of Maiduguri Metropolitan Council) sued the Borno 
state government for passage of the SJLGA Law 2002, challenging the right of the state 
government to deduct local government funds at source. The High Court held that the 
state government had power to pass the law under section 162(8) of the Constitution, but 
declared unconstitutional the specific provisions that empower the committee to deduct 
funds at source. This judgment was delivered in June 2002. However, as indicated in 
Table 1 the deductions continued. The Borno example is a reflection of the situation 
affecting other local government councils across Nigeria. 
                                                 
2  The Nigerian dollar is the Naira. 
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Table 1: Deductions at source from LGC funds by Borno State Government  
(March 2002 – March 2003) in Nigerian dollars (millions) 
 
LGC  Gross Allocation  Total Deduction (source)  Net Allocation 
                                           
Abadam  437.1   165 (37.7%)   272.1  
Askira/Uba 504   325 (64.5%)   179 
Bama  627   300 (47.8%)   327.2 
Bayo  390   156 (40.0%)   234 
Biu  558.0   303.4 (54.4%)   252 
Chibok  361   185.4 (51.4%)   175.4 
Damboa  632   293  (46.3%)   339 
Dikwa  444   207.2 (46.7%)   236.4 
Gubio  410   143.1 (35.0%)   266.3 
Guzamala 420   161.2 (35.0%)   259 
Gwoza  540   314 (58.1%)   226.3 
Hawul  500   356 (71.2%)   144.2 
Jere  753.2   339.4 (45.1%)   414 
Kaga  431.2   213.4 (49.5%)   218 
Kala Balge 343.1   167.3 (48.8%)   176 
Konduga  646.1   293 (45.3%)   353.1 
Kukawa  501   207.3 (41.4%)   294 
Kwaya Kusar 364   198 (54.4%)   166 
Mafa  419   183 (43.6%)   236.3 
Magumeri 487.1   192.4 (39.5%)   295 
MMC  993   599.3 (65.0%)   323.4 
Marte  457   209 (45.7%)   248 
Mobbar  450.3   171 (37.9%)   280 
Monguno  441   207 (47.0%)   234 
Ngala  473   212.2 (44.9%)   261 
Nganzai  385   150 (38.9%)   235.1 
Shani  421   189.1 (44.9%)   232 
 
TOTAL  13388.1    6440.7 (48.4%)         6876.8 
 
(Dlakwa 2004: 121) 
 
Conclusion 
Intergovernmental relations are supposed to play a ‘bridge building’ role to bring a 
degree of coordination and cooperation to divided powers (Okafor 2007:16). Following 
from this, the operation of the SJLGA as provided for in the constitution should 
contribute to cooperative administration, accountability and transparency in local 
governance within the principle of separation of powers and the rule of law. However, 
the reality in Nigerian local government indicates the opposite. As evident from the 
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Borno example, state governments interfere with the financial autonomy of local 
governments through the instrument of the SJLGA. This has greatly hampered the 
developmental efforts of local government councils. As a remedy to this most 
unsatisfactory situation, Sections 162(6) and (8) should be expunged from the 1999 
Constitution of Nigeria.   
 
It is also suggested that, via a constitutional amendment, the sub-sections on SJLGA 
should be replaced with (a) direct allocations to local government councils and (b) the 
establishment of an independent audit agency comprising federal, state, local government 
and private representatives. These members must have a proven track record of financial 
management to supervise, inspect and audit the use of statutory allocations by local 
government councils. This would provide ‘checks and balances’ on local government 
officials’ administration of finance matters to ensure accountability and transparency in 
the use of local government funds. 
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